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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY





D. Retail Installment Sales Act
There were no cases decided during the survey period dealing
with the law of personal property. There was one case concerning
the Uniform Sales Act, one case construing provisions of the Con-




Privity of Contract.-The Tennessee courts have heretofore denied
recovery in actions for breach of warranty in the absence of privity
of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.' The required
privity had not previously been found when a manufacturer was
sued by a consumer who purchased from an intermediate dealer. 2
A case was decided during the survey period which casts a shadow
upon the requirement of privity in such actions. In General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson3 the wife of a purchaser of an automobile was
allowed to recover from the manufacturer for personal injuries
sustained as a result of defective brakes. The suit was based solely
on the theory of breach of warranty.4 The effect of this case is not
entirely clear. Strictly speaking, it did not hold that privity is no
*Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee; former Editor-in-Chief, Vanderbilt Law
Review.
1. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721
(1942).
2. It is necessary to distinguish between a suit by a consumer against a
manufacturer on the contractual theory of breach of warranty and a tort
action for negligence. It is recognized in Tennessee that "where a product is
such that, if negligently made, it may reasonably be expected to injure the
person or property of an ultimate user of it, then, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer is under a duty to such user to make it carefully." Dunn
v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (M.S. 1954). The
distinction is important because it may often be possible to prove a breach
of warranty although a manufacturer had exercised the utmost care and
would consequently not be responsible in tort.
3. 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1960). For an excellent comment on this case
and a similar New Jersey case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), see 14 VAim. L. REv. 681 (1961).
4. 338 S.W.2d at 658.
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longer required to support an action for breach of warranty. How-
ever, it evidenced a strong tendency to find privity in a relationship
in which it had not previously been recognized by the courts of this
state.
In holding that General Motors was liable on the theory of breach
of an express warranty the court stated that there was evidence from
which the jury could have found that the dealer was a "conduit or
subterfuge" and that General Motors was the entity with whom the
consumer-plaintiff dealt.5 Thus there was found a basis on which to
predicate liability, even though the warranty was actually given to
the purchaser by the dealer. However, on petition to rehear, the
court said that the facts would support a recovery even if there were
no privity between General Motors and the plaintiff.6 Although the
strength of this statement is weakened by the fact that it is not
necessary to the holding, as well as by the court's citation of neg-
ligence rather than breach of warranty cases,7 the fact that it appears
in the opinion is a strong indication that the privity requirement may
be abolished in the near future.
B. Implied Warranty
Contractual Disclaimer.-In the Dodson case, there was an alter-
native holding that the consumer could recover on the theory of an
implied warranty of quality or fitness.8 The significance of such a
holding lies in the fact that the express warranty which the court
found running from General Motors to the plaintiff recited that it
was "expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied
... "9 This disclaimer was ignored in spite of the fact that Ten-
nessee Code Annotated section 47-1215 (6) seems to allow this method
5. 338 S.W.2d at 661. The evidence from which the jury could have found
this to be true was the fact that General Motors gave a written warranty to
the dealer and required the dealer to give the same warranty to the purchaser
of the automobile. The court said that "the practical effect of this entire
plan was that General Motors gave the warranty to the ultimate consumer."
338 S.W.2d at 660. On petition to rehear, the court found that advertisements
made by General Motors are for the benefit of purchasers rather than dealers,
and therefore "form a part of the express warranty which General Motors
gives to the consumer." 338 S.W.2d at 665.
6. 338 S.W.2d at 665.
7. Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (M.S.
1954); Burnett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421
(1912).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1215 (1956) governs the existence of implied war-
ranties of merchantability. The court cited § 47-1215 (1), which provides that
when goods are bought for a specified purpose there is an implied warranty of
fitness for that purpose; § 47-1215(2), providing for implied warranty of
merchantable quality when goods are bought by description; and § 47-1215 (6),
which provides that an express warranty does not exclude an implied
warranty "unless inconsistent therewith."
9. 338 S.W.2d at 659.
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of eliminating an implied warranty. Although a definite determina-
tion of the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers of implied war-
ranties must await a case in which the outcome rests solely on a
resolution of this issue, the Dodson case reveals a tendency to ignore
this provision of the Uniform Sales Act.
C. Conditional Sales
Sale Postponed Until Final Judgment in Replevin Action.-Under
the Conditional Sales Act as enacted in Tennessee, a conditional
vendor must advertise the property for sale within ten days after
repossession and proceed to sale under such advertisement. 10 If the
vendor fails to advertise and sell as required by statute, the de-
faulting vendee may recover from the seller any part of the con-
sideration which he has paid." Such a recovery seems to be based
on the theory of rescission of the contract by the seller and restitution
of the benefits conferred upon him, rather than a penalty.'
2
A problem arises in such a situation when the vendor regains pos-
session of the chattel by means of replevin. It has been held in
Tennessee that if the vendee contests the vendor's right to retake
possession, the vendor is not obligated to sell the property prior to a
final judgment in the replevin suit.13 However, he may proceed to
sale prior to a final determination of the replevin action and make
reparation on his replevin bond if he loses in that proceeding.14 On
the other hand, if the right of the vendor to repossess by replevin
is not controverted, he must proceed to advertise and sell within the
statutory period. 5
Atkinson v. Commerce Union Bank,16 decided during the survey
period, reaffirms the prior holdings that a conditional vendor who
repossesses by replevin is not obligated to sell until the replevin
suit is finally determined, if the vendee contests the replevin. To
what extent the purchaser controverted the right to repossess by
replevin does not appear. 1
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1302 (1956).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1306 (1956).
12. See Nashville Auto Sales Co. v. Wright, 26 Tenn. App. 326, 171 S.W.2d
834 (M.S. 1943).
13. Lieberman v. Puckett, 94 Tenn. 273, 29 S.W. 6 (1895).
14. Model Garage Co. v. Sanders, 165 Tenn. 168, 54 S.W.2d 939 (1932). This
makes sense, since the replevin bond is double the value of the property, so
that the defendant-vendee cannot be prejudiced by a sale before determination
of the replevin action. On the other hand, if the vendee could delay a sale
by appealing the replevin suit, without having to give bond, the seller might
stand to lose much of the value of his security.
15. Nashville Auto Sales v. Wright, 26 Tenn. App. 326, 171 S.W.2d 834
(M.S. 1943).
16. 337 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1960).
17. Counsel for the purchaser argued that the replevin judgment was an
agreed judgment. However, the court said that it could have been appealed
135119611
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
D. Retail Installment Sales Act
A Retail Installment Sales Act was enacted in 1961 for the purpose
of regulating retail installment transactions. 8 The act requires cer-
tain items to appear on installment contracts and charge agreements,
a copy of which must be given to the buyer; the act's purpose is to
make clear to the buyer the additional price attributable to the fact
that the goods are purchased on time. 9 The amount of such time
price differential is also regulated. 0 The buyer can prepay at any
time and secure a refund credit of the proper proportion of the time
price differential, notwithstanding any provision in the contract to
the contrary.21 Any waiver of the requirements of this statute is
unenforceable and void,22 and an intentional violation of its pro-
visions is made a misdemeanor.3 Failure to meet the statutory re-
quirements also renders the seller liable for the time price differential
and all amounts payable under the contract, or for double the time
price differential if the violation is unintentional.24
within thirty days and therefore the vendor could await the expiration of
that period. This may be a departure from Nashville Auto Sales v. Wright,
supra note 15, which held that the vendor must advertise and sell within the
statutory time limit if the replevin is not litigated. Unfortunately, the facts
are insufficient to determine this with certainty.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1901 to -1911 (Supp. 1961).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1903 (Supp. 1961).
20. The time price differential is limited to 10% on the first $500, 8% on
the amount of the principal balance exceeding $500 but less than $5000, and
6% on any balance exceeding $5000. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1903 (d) (Supp.
1961). In the case of retail charge. agreements, the limit is fifteen cents
per ten dollars per month, with a nmmum of 700.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1903 (h) (Supp. 1961).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1908 (Supp. 1961).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1907 (Supp. 1961).
24. Ibid.
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